"How does a company ensure respect for the human rights of local communities when circumstances dictate that they must rely on the protection of public security forces with a history of committing human rights violations?"

The dilemma for responsible business is how to ensure the responsible protection of people and assets, whilst at the same time relying on public security providers over which it has limited control. Companies will often prefer to rely on public security providers for protection, for reasons of costs and accountability. This will only be the case, however, where such providers are characterised by high levels of professionalism, legitimate government control, legal oversight and respect for human rights. Ironically, this will generally be in areas where no such protection is required.

Where public security provision is imperative (for example in areas of weak governance, conflict and post-conflict conditions), companies are more likely to enter into relationships with security forces with questionable human rights records. In some operational environments, enlisting a public security provider might be an attractive choice to protect company personnel and assets.

Alternatively, circumstances may dictate that the company is obliged to rely on public security forces if they are to proceed with their operations. Taking this route may be a matter of law (for example in the general provision of law and order by the government), government insistence (for example in relation to ‘strategic' national projects) or even extortionate demands by security forces themselves.

Such situations will often present a dilemma to companies in terms of whether they should proceed with an operation at all (i.e. whether the benefits outweigh the risks). A variable in this decision-making process will be the extent to which a company believes it will be able to exercise a degree of influence or control over public security providers.

Real-world examples

Barrick Gold Corp. compensates Papua New Guinea women after alleged rapes by security forces

In April 2015, Barrick Gold Corporation agreed to pay compensation to 11 women from the Enga tribe who were allegedly subject to sexual violence by security guards employed at the company's Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG).1 The Porgera mine had a large private security force of approximately 450 guards in 2011, necessary to protect the mine assets from violent raids by illegal miners.

The 11 women are among 137 Enga women who said they were sexually assaulted and imprisoned by Porgera security guards. The 11 women refused to accept a previous compensation package offered under a "remedy framework" sponsored by Barrick Gold, when allegations were first published by Human Rights Watch in 2011.

In response to the claims, Barrick dismissed about a dozen workers implicated in the assaults or known to have not acted on knowledge of the alleged assaults. In addition, the company facilitated and cooperated with a PNG investigation. The compensation payment was the result of a negotiated settlement with Earth Rights International (ERI), the legal representative of the Enga women.

Amnesty International alleges multi-national mining companies are complicit in security force abuses in Myanmar

In February 2015, Amnesty International issued a highly critical report of human rights impacts at the Monywa Copper complex, which includes the Sabetaung and Kyisintaung (S&K) and the Letpadaung copper mines.2 The report alleges that the mine is linked to large-scale forced evictions in the 1990s and that community protests have been met with excessive force by police. Amnesty notes that rather than addressing people's concerns, the authorities have responded by arbitrarily arresting and detaining activists and participants in peaceful protests. As such, Amnesty claims that the government of Myanmar is responsible for the serious human rights violations that have taken place at the Monywa complex. However, Amnesty also states that the Canadian and Burmese companies, Ivanhoe Mines and Myanmar Wanbao Mining involved in developing the mine also bear responsibility for the adverse impacts.

Norwegian Council on Ethics recommends exclusion of Tahoe Resources from the pension fund because of security force violations at the Escobal Mine in Guatemala

In February 2015, the Norwegian Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund Global reiterated its recommendation, first given in 2014, to exclude Tahoe Resources from the Fund on the grounds of the company's ongoing risk of contributing to human rights violations.3 The Council noted that the company's opening of the Escobal mine in Guatemala had triggered acts of violence and occurred without proper respect for public consultation processes. A key incident influencing the Council's decision was the April 2013 shooting of anti-mine protestors by private security guards working for a security provider that did not adhere to the International Standards on Protocol for Security Service Providers. The Council expressed concern that the company's systems and strategies were still unable to identify, prevent and remedy human rights violations connected to the mine.

Striking Lonmin miners killed by South African security forces

On 16 August 2012, 34 people were killed by police at the site of a miners' strike in Marikana, North West province, South Africa. Over 3,000 miners had gathered on a hillside near the mine, some armed with clubs and machetes, protesting for a monthly wage increase of around US$1,000. Eyewitness reports suggest protestors had charged, causing the police to open fire. The police also claimed the miners had begun ‘firing shots'. However, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) claimed the force used by the police had been excessive, and accused them of having committed a ‘massacre'. The shootings came after several days of violence in which 10 people, including two police officers, were killed.4

• For examples of how multi-national companies such as Talisman Energy, BP, Chevron, Anglo American, BHP Billiton and others have addressed such dilemmas through, for example, multilateral security agreements, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the provision of human rights training, as well as other methods, see:
  Security forces and human rights case studies
• Please contribute your commentary or suggestions to our online discussion forum:
  Security forces and human rights online discussion forum

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Business and public security

Companies are likely to come across this dilemma in a number of situations, including those where:

• There is particular government interest in a project/operation for political, economic or other reasons
• The project is taking place in a conflict or post-conflict environment that by its very nature demands a strong public security presence
• No realistic alternative can be found for the responsible protection of people and assets (due to commercial, political or legal restraints)
• The company is subject to effective extortion by public security providers who purport to be providing protection, but who are in fact a potential threat if the company refuses to make payments

Security can be provided on three broad bases:

• General public security provision, paid for by the state as part of its general public responsibilities
• Special public security provision, paid for by the state in order to provide additional protection to specific areas or assets related to company activities
• Special public security provision, supported by a company (whether through financing or otherwise) in order to provide additional protection to specific areas or assets related to company activities

In many parts of the world, local public security forces will have a history of abusing the human rights of local communities and other groups. Typical forms of abuse can range from the relatively minor (such as illegitimate surveillance and intimidation) to the very serious (such as sexual violence and unlawful killings).

Business preference for responsible and legitimate public security provision

In some cases, general public security provision will have to be accepted in order for relevant projects to proceed – whether as a matter of law, public policy or contract.

Companies will often consider it preferable to employ responsible and legitimate public security providers for their protection when operating in environments characterised by instability and/or high levels of criminality. Taking this route will free companies from having to employ private security providers – usually at considerable cost. In addition, in cases where local governance is stronger, public security forces are likely to enjoy a higher degree of social, legal and political legitimacy compared to private security forces, as well as the political and financial backing of government authorities.

Government preference for public security provision

Similarly, governments will often prefer that companies do not employ armed private security forces. This is due to concerns about national sovereignty, the legitimate monopoly on the use of force and issues of accountability and control. In certain cases, governments are likely to be particularly keen to ensure their security forces support company activity. For example:

Extractive projects will often be of strategic importance to the country of operation, located in remote areas and may even play a direct role in local instability (e.g. due to community unrest or efforts by rival groups to control revenue-generating assets). Host governments will often have a direct interest in the project (e.g. through a joint venture or production sharing agreement) and be highly motivated to ensure its safety and continuity (e.g. maintenance of public revenues). Governments will also be keen to demonstrate their ability to provide a secure and stable operating/investment environment

For example, in November 2007 the government of Saudi Arabia announced it was forming a special 35,000-strong rapid reaction force to protect its energy installations from attacks by militants.In 2015, due to credible threats of a terrorist attack targeting Saudi Aramco energy operations, this security force was on high alert.

Likewise, in February 2010, it was reported that the Ugandan army was creating a special unit to protect strategic assets including the oil fields located in the Lake Albert basin. Two out of the three fields, which border relatively unstable parts of eastern DR Congo, are being developed by UK-based Tullow Oil.5

Major infrastructure projects (such as dams, energy generation, roads, etc.) will often be of political and strategic relevance for host governments. The reasoning behind this is two-fold: 1) such projects are often funded by, or carried out on behalf of the government and 2) such projects represent substantial and visible actions by the government to promote national development (and so garner political support)

For example, the Amnesty International Report 2012 states that, in July 2011, four people were injured by Ecuadorian police during demonstrations against the construction of a dam on the Rio Grande in Chone city, Manabi province. Members of local indigenous communities were protesting against the forced eviction of around 1,700 families that would result from the project. Police reacted by entering and destroying farmland belonging to the families, and forcibly removing protesters. The project has been awarded to the China Tiesju Civil Engineering Group.6 In addition, indigenous community leaders were also subjected to arbitrary charges of sabotage, terrorism, murder and illegal obstruction of roads whilst demonstrating against extractive industry operations.7

Defence-related products or services (e.g. arms sales and training, related technology projects, engineering projects, etc.) are likely to be subject to strong public security protection. In some cases, companies will be in a direct commercial relationship with a country's military, which will set many of the operational conditions.

Human rights abuse scenarios

In many parts of the developing world, however, public security forces will often have a history of human rights abuse. This is particularly common in the following scenarios:

Repressive governments that are not subject to the rule of law and which use public security forces to maintain political control in the absence of democratic legitimacy

An example of this can be found in Myanmar, where the state is controlled by the armed forces via the ruling junta. Total's Yadana gas project (in which Chevron is also involved) has generated considerable controversy due to allegations of complicity with the actions of the military, including those relating to forced labour and other serious violations. In 2011, human rights organisation, Earth Rights International alleged that the military continued to force thousands of Burmese to work portering, carrying wood and repairing roads and military buildings, in the Yadana pipeline area.

Political instability and/or conflict, meaning legitimate public security forces have a mandate for strong action and are subject to only limited civilian control (whether through the government or the courts)

An example of this can be found in Nigeria, where the military – including the Joint Task Force (JTF) created in 2004– has been tasked with suppression of active militancy and criminality in the Niger Delta. Violence in the region has seen numerous attacks and kidnappings targeting multi-national oil companies, such as Shell, Chevron and Agip, as well as state assets. In May 2009, for example, Amnesty International reported that initial action by the Joint Task Force (including use of helicopter gunships) killed at least 100 civilians and displaced 10,000.8 Furthermore, Amnesty International released a public statement in October 2013 seeking a probe into the reported extrajudicial killings of suspects in detention facilities run by the JTF.9Instability and weak governance, meaning public security forces of questionable legitimacy essentially act on an independent basis with little or no civilian oversight

An example of this can be found in eastern DR Congo, where some ‘integrated' units made up of former anti-government rebels are nominally part of the national armed forces, but which in reality operate independently and at great cost to the local population. In March 2011, for example, the UN's Third joint report of seven United Nations experts on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted that "…serious human rights violations by armed groups and members of the national security forces continued, including acts of arbitrary execution; rape; arbitrary arrest and detention; torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; and looting". Such violations were at least partly attributed to "…structural shortcomings and … deficiencies in State institutions". Similar concerns were still being raised in the report given by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council in July 2015. The High Commissioner stated, "In the western provinces, particularly in Kinshasa, the deplorable shrinking of democratic space resulted in serious violations of fundamental freedoms by security forces, mainly targeting political opponents, human rights defenders and protesters."10 In addition, the report noted that the government expelled the Director of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office from the country, after the publication of a report about human rights violations committed by the Congolese national police during Operation Likofi in Kinshasa between 2013 and 2014.

Poorly trained and financed security forces can present a serious challenge, even when they are acting on behalf of and under the general control of legitimate governments. Problems will not necessarily appear at unit-level, but may instead be manifested through individual acts of ill-discipline and independent action. Likewise, poor funding (and non-payment of salaries in particular) is likely to result in corruption and criminality.

These issues can be found in Mexico, for example, where members of the internal security forces have been accused of corruption and severe human rights abuses. The US Department of State's 2014 Human Rights Report on Mexico states that "significant human rights-related problems included police and military involvement in serious abuses, such as unlawful killings, torture, disappearances, and physical abuse. Impunity and corruption remained serious problems, particularly at the state and local levels, in the security forces, and in the judicial sector."11

Commissioning of violations by suppliers and business partners

In rare cases companies may directly commission human rights violations or other activities that result in infringements on individual rights. Whilst multi-national companies are highly unlikely to partake in such activities, they may nonetheless find themselves accused of complicity where suppliers, local business partners or host governments act unscrupulously.

Within a company, this might include the use of security personnel to:

• Discourage union activity
• Extract forced labour
• Enforce workforce discipline

Outside of a company, this might include the use of security personnel to:

• Clear land for exploitation
• Intimidate local communities, NGOs and activists
• Minimise security risks through unjustifiably violent tactics
• Extract forced labour from communities

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Examples of scenarios companies might face when operating in emerging economies include:

Brazil: Land disputes in rural areas of Brazil often turn violent. Multi-nationals have been targeted by landless workers' movements in the form of raids, protests and sabotage. Multi-nationals, as well as legal and illegal landowners, often engage public and private security forces to protect business operations and employees in areas that are difficult to police. Conflicts between landowners and landless workers and indigenous peoples have reportedly led to human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced evictions and torture.

Algeria: Islamist attacks in the Maghreb region pose a security risk to multinational companies. On 16 January 2013, the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas became the site of a hostage crisis when radical Islamist terrorists, affiliated with Al-Qaeda and led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, attacked the facility. With limited consultation of foreign governments, Algerian special forces attacked the facility in order to free the workers taken hostage. As a result of this operation, 792 workers were freed and 40 hostages were killed. Businesses reliant on state security forces for protection against such attacks may be exposed to the risk of association with human rights abuses. This is because the  as the Algerian military and police are reported to prevent peaceful protests by arbitrarily arresting participants and are alleged to use methods of torture.12

Egypt: Violent radical Islamist groups represent a security risk. In recent years, Egypt has seen a new terrorist threat emerge in the Sinai Peninsula, with three major attacks on tourist resorts in 2004, 2005 and 2006 that killed over 100 people. TIn 2015, the 2015 bombing of a Russian tourist jet after taking off from Sharm el-Sheikh and other small-scale attacks in 2016, reflect the increasing security threat. Companies relying on state security forces for protection against the terrorist threats are, however, at risk of association with human rights violations. Egypt's security forces have been accused of a range of human rights violations, including torture, ill-treatment, harassment and unlawful killings in an environment of impunity. According to Human Rights Watch, over 80 people died in clashes with the police during protests in January 2015 and "security forces – apparently unnerved by rising armed group attacks – invoked national security to muzzle nearly all dissent."13

India: The majority of extrajudicial and unlawful killings in India arise in the context of internal armed conflicts and separatist, ethnic and communal violence. The security forces have been accused of carrying out widespread human rights violations, including killings, torture and excessive use of force with impunity.

Indonesia: The Indonesian security forces reportedly carry out extrajudicial killings and torture, including the use of excessive force and sexual violence, with impunity. Such violations have also occurred in the context of business operations. Allegations have also been made that, in some cases, the security forces create contexts in which their services are required to maintain order so as to reap financial benefits.

Mexico: Human rights risk in Mexico is predominantly linked to escalating drug-related violence. Powerful drug cartels, most active in the northern regions around Ciudad Juárez, are waging a high impact campaign of intimidation and murder that continues to result in serious violations of human security. The ‘war on drugs' has reportedly led to widespread human rights violations, including unlawful killings, rape, torture and arbitrary detention by the state security forces.

Philippines: The Philippines is currently engaged in internal armed conflicts with a number of armed groups. Armed groups have on occasion threatened business interests through extortion and violence. In response, the government has announced plans to increase militarisation of mining sites using guards from the paramilitary group Citizens Armed Force Geographical Unit, rather than the state security forces. Counterinsurgency security forces have reportedly been responsible for human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, torture and enforced disappearances.

Turkey: In addition to the risk of association with human rights violations by the Turkish security forces, businesses may be exposed to violations committed by so-called "village guards". In Turkey, state security forces have recruited village guards from Kurdish communities to assist in internal operations, especially against the armed opposition group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey's village guards, who are concentrated in the southeast of the country, are considered to be less disciplined and professional than other security forces. They are regularly implicated in theft, rape and other human rights violations. Inadequate oversight and compensation of village guards from the central government is believed to account for their behaviour.14

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Legal risks

Contraventions of local law by public security providers – whether related to human rights or not – should result in criminal charges against the perpetrators. In practice, this is often not the case due to weak governance, uncertain rule of law or government complicity. This – as well as the ‘arms-length' relationship that usually exists between public security providers and businesses – means that criminal charges of corporate complicity are relatively unlikely.

More commonly, companies may face civil claims – either at a domestic or international level. The US has provided a favoured forum for claims of this nature, as the Alien Tort Claims Act has historically allowed foreign citizens a means by which to initiate actions for legal torts committed outside of the US. The ability of foreign citizens to bring claims under the Act has since been restricted as a result of the US Supreme Court's 2013 judgement in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co. (Shell).15

High profile legal cases in the US relating to alleged company complicity in human rights abuses by public security forces include:

• Thomson Safaris v. Soitambu Village Council: In 2010, semi nomadic Maasai pastoralists filed a claim in Tanzania against Tanzania Breweries (TB) and Tanzania Conservation Ltd (TC a Tanzanian subsidiary of Thomson Safaris, a US-based tourism safari company). 16 The plaintiffs allege that the companies forcefully evicted them from their ancestral land, and acquired it without their prior consent. In addition, they claim that when trying to access grazing and water sources on these lands, they have been shot and beaten and arrested. In 2014, the plaintiffs initiated proceedings in a US federal court and the case is ongoing.
• John Doe I et al v. Unocal Corp: US oil company Unocal was sued in the US and settled out of court in December 2004 for the alleged use of forced labour and other abuses by the Burmese military prior to their construction of an oil pipeline. At the time, the Burmese government was Unocal's joint venture partner in the project.17
• Bowoto et al v. Chevron et al: In 1999, a group of Nigerians from the Niger Delta sued Chevron in the US under the Alien Tort Claims Act claiming company complicity in violations committed by Nigerian security forces that resulted in three deaths, allegations of torture and significant property damage. In December 2008, a jury cleared Chevron of the allegations, ending the decade-long case.18
• John Doe I et al v. ExxonMobil Corp et al: In 2001, Indonesian villagers sued ExxonMobil in the US federal court alleging complicity in murder, torture, sexual abuse and kidnapping by the Indonesian military, who they alleged had been provided with logistical and financial support by ExxonMobil to provide security for its natural gas facilities in Aceh. On 30 September 2009, the US District Court granted ExxonMobil's motion to dismiss the case finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the case in a US court. However, on 8 July 2011, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that a company should not be immune from liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act, and remanding the case to the lower court.19
• Wiwa v. Shell: In June 2009, Shell paid US$15.5 million in an out of court settlement relating to accusations that it was complicit in the deaths of nine activists in 1995, including Ken Saro-Wiwa. Despite the payment to the activists' families, Shell denies liability. The case was filed in the US under the Alien Tort Claims Act. In the early 1990s, Saro-Wiwa was a vocal critic of Shell, as well as its impact on local Ogoni communities and the environment. All nine activists were reportedly tortured by Nigerian security forces and were hanged for allegedly murdering political rivals in November 1995 following a trial that human rights activists denounced as a sham. The plaintiffs claimed Shell provided the military with transportation, including helicopters.
• Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: In 2006, a group of Nigerian citizens brought an action against Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell), claiming that the company had aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing abuses against oil and gas development protestors during the 1990s, in violation of customary international law (CIL). Initially, the US District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims on the grounds that CIL did not sufficiently define the violations alleged, including extrajudicial killing, forced exile and property destruction. In September 2010, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld this decision, on the grounds that, among other things, corporate liability is not a discernible norm of CIL. On appeal, the US Supreme Court ordered the case to be heard in the October 2012 term on the basis of the following question; "whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute … allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States."20 The Court dismissed the case on 17 April 2013, supporting the restriction of the application of the Alien Tort Claims Act.

The US is not the only jurisdiction in which such cases are being adjudicated. In 2015, for example, African Barrick Gold (now Acacia) reached an out of court settlement with 12 claimants in Tanzania.21 The claimants initiated proceedings against African Barrick Gold and its subsidiary, North Mara Gold Mine Limited (NMGML) in the UK High Court in 2013. The Tanzanian villagers alleged that the companies failed to prevent the use of excessive force by police against villagers at the North Mara mine.

Other risks

Even where allegations of complicity do not result in legal action, companies can still face a range of non-legal risks. These can be of a short term nature (e.g. operational disruptions as a result of community unrest aimed at public security forces and/or the company) or of a long term nature (e.g. sustained consumer campaigns that ultimately require a change in company strategy or policy with respect to the country in question).

These can include:

• Consumer boycotts resulting in reduced sales
• Divestment by ethical and mainstream investors resulting in reduced access to capital
• Negative press and activist campaigns resulting in brand erosion
• Loss of social licence to operate resulting in community animosity and higher costs
• Loss of political licence to operate resulting in non-cooperation by the government and diminished future business opportunities
• Escalating security situations resulting in threats to employees and assets, as well as higher security costs
• Violation of agreed financing conditions relating to security and conflict-sensitive practices
• Violation of the company's political risk insurance policy, where this requires certain conflict-sensitive practices

A prime example of the kinds of risks faced by companies, includes an active movement to boycott companies with business links in Sudan. This includes Investors Against Genocide, which runs a shareholder proposal campaign to advance ‘genocide-free' investing. In particular it focuses on "four major oil companies that are partnering with the Government of Sudan and helping to fund the genocide in Darfur". These include PetroChina, Sinopec, ONGC of India and Petronas of Malaysia. Examples include divestment by American Funds of US$190 million of PetroChina assets in February 2010, as well as divestment by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) from all holdings in PetroChina, CNPC, Sinopec and ONGC (worth US$58 million).

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For a company to responsibly address public security forces and human rights, it should first look to comply with relevant national laws. Where national laws are set lower than international standards on security forces and human rights, then companies should strive to meet these higher standards.

According to the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy' policy framework22 as updated and elaborated in 2011 in the Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework23 businesses have a responsibility to respect all human rights. This responsibility requires businesses to refrain from violating the rights of others and to address any adverse human rights impacts of their operations.

To meet this responsibility to respect human rights, the framework notes that a responsible company should engage in human rights due diligence24 to a level commensurate with the risk of infringements posed by the country context in which a company operates, its own business activities and the relationships associated with those activities.25

The framework, as clarified by the Guiding Principles, specifies the main components of human rights due diligence:

A policy statement articulating the company's commitment to respect human rights and providing guidance as to the specific actions to be taken to give this commitment meaning: This policy should be informed by appropriate internal and external expertise and identify what the company expects of its personnel and business partners. The policy should be approved at the most senior level and communicated internally and externally to all personnel, business partners and relevant stakeholders. In addition, it should be reflected in appropriate operational policies and procedures

Periodic assessment of actual and potential human rights impacts of company activities and relationships: Human rights due diligence will vary in scope and complexity according to the size of a company, the severity of its human rights risks and the context of its operations. Impact assessment must be continuous, recognising that human rights risks may change over time as companies' operations and operating contexts evolve. The process should draw on internal and external human rights experts and resources. Furthermore, it should involve meaningful engagement with potentially affected individuals and groups, as well as other relevant stakeholders

Integration of these commitments into internal control and oversight systems: Effective integration requires the responsibility for addressing the impacts by assigning it to the appropriate structures of the company. It also requires appropriate internal decision-making mechanisms, budget allocation and oversight processes

Tracking of performance: Tracking of performance should be based on appropriate qualitative and quantitative metrics and should draw on feedback from both internal and external stakeholders. In addition, it should inform and support continuous improvement

Public and regular reporting on performance: When reporting, companies should take into account the risks the communication of certain information may pose to stakeholders themselves, or to company personnel. In addition, the content of the reports should be subject to the legitimate requirements of commercial confidentiality

Remediation: Where business enterprises identify responsibility for adverse impacts, they should cooperate will all relevant stakeholders in their remediation through legitimate processes.

The Guiding Principles emphasize the challenges of doing business in conflict-affected areas, by stating that ‘the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in [such areas]'.26 Businesses are advised to pay special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence which tend to be especially prevalent during times of conflict.27 The Commentary to this section of the Guiding Principles states that ‘[i]nnovative and practical approaches are needed' in order to avoid contributing to human rights violations in these environments'.

While designing its Human Rights Impact Assessment, businesses may wish to consult existing guidance documents, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), UN Global Compact and International Business Leaders Forum's (IBLF) Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management.28 This latter guide provides companies with a ‘process to assess their business risks, enhance their due diligence procedures and effectively manage their human rights challenges.' The online guide takes users through different stages of the impact assessment process, including Preparation, Identification, Engagement, Assessment, Mitigation, Management and Evaluation.

Other specific actions to responsibly address public security forces and human rights can include:29

1. Adhering to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

Adhere to the terms of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles). Actions should include:

• Risk assessment: This should cover security risks, potential for violence, human rights records, rule of law, conflict analysis and equipment transfers
• Security arrangements: Companies should consult with host governments and local communities about the impact of their security arrangements on those communities. They should also encourage security to be provided in a manner consistent with its policies and encourage transparency (subject to security concerns)
• Deployment and conduct: Companies should use their influence to ensure:

• (a) Individuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses do not provide security
• (b) Only necessary and proportional force should be used
• (c) The rights of individuals should not be violated while exercising the right to exercise freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the right to engage in collective bargaining, or other related rights
• Where physical force is used by public security personnel, it should be reported to the appropriate authorities and the company. Medical aid should be provided to injured persons, including to offenders.

• Consultation and advice: Companies should hold regular and structured meetings with public security providers to discuss security, human rights and related workplace safety issues. They should also consult other companies, their host and home governments, and civil society. Companies – whether individually or collectively – should promote observance of applicable international law enforcement principles when consulting with host governments, as well as human rights training for public security personnel30
• Responses to human rights abuses: Companies should report all credible allegations of human rights abuses by public security personnel in their areas of operation to the host government. If appropriate, the company should push for investigation of these claims. Companies should also monitor the use of any equipment it has provided to public security forces and investigate incidents of misuse
• In October 2014, stakeholders in the Voluntary Principles agreed in a public statement that Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between companies and state security forces are "a critical tool to ensure that key expectations and decision-making processes and procedures can be established and agreed to – in writing – before potentially dangerous conflagrations occur".31 Recognising that managing relations with state security forces is challenging for companies, the Voluntary Principles stakeholders noted that MOUs enable the company and public security forces to delineate their respective duties and obligations with respect to the provision of security in and around the relevant operation

Current participants in the Voluntary Principles include nine governments (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Ghana, The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the US, UK) and ten NGOs (including Human Rights Watch).32 Amnesty International withdrew from the Voluntary Principles in 2013. The organisation reiterated its support for the Principles, which it helped to formulate, but expressed concerns with the initiative's capacity to hold member companies accountable to the Principles.33 The Voluntary Principles' 2014-2016 strategy addresses this concern by committing to establishing a credible process to verify fulfilment of the Principles.34 Corporate participants include:

AngloGold Ashanti	Newmont Mining Corporation
Anglo American	Norsk Hydro
Barrick Gold Corporation	Occidental Petroleum Corporation
BG Group	PanAust
BHP Billiton	Pacific Rubiales
BP	Premier Oil
Chevron	Repsol
ConocoPhillips	Rio Tinto
ExxonMobil	Shell
Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold	Sherritt International
Glencore	Talisman Energy
Hess Corporation	Statoil
Marathon Oil	Total
Newcrest Mining Limited	Tullow Oil

• In 2014, BP recruited a full-time Voluntary Principles Advisor and joined the Steering Committee of the initiative. BP noted that geographic areas where they had prioritised Voluntary Principles activity included Angola, Iraq, Indonesia and Turkey. See:
• BP (global)
• Freeport McMoran developed and applied human rights assessments specifically tailored to sites in the DR Congo and Indonesia In 2014. See:
•  Freeport McMoran (global)
• Newmont Mining prioritises human rights training of private or state security providers as a key element of the Voluntary Principles. In 2015, it noted that it was focusing its efforts on operations in Peru, Indonesia, Ghana and Suriname as areas where its operations are most at-risk of association with security-related incidents with human rights implications. See:
• Newmont Mining (Global)
• Shell, which included the Voluntary Principles into Shell's Group Security Standards in 2007, has used them to inform their standard annual risk assessment (including the addition of background checks on security staff) and references them when working with public security providers. See:
• Shell (Global)
• Kinross Gold Corporation reports that in 2014 it delivered training to all of its security workforce as part of the company's Human Rights Adherence and Verification Program (HRA&VP). This represents an increase on 81% of personnel trained in 2013. See:
• Kinross Gold Corporation – in depth
• In 2011, Eni carried out an extensive training exercise on the application of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights at its Bhit field in Pakistan – and gained valuable insight from participants on the value of the sensitive treatment of community members and the need to coordinate security activities with sustainability actions. See:
• Eni (Pakistan)
• In January 2014, Rio Tinto extended its commitment to training its security providers on the Voluntary Principles, through online and in-person courses that mitigated the risk of conflict at key sites in Africa. Rio Tinto (Global)
• African Barrick Gold plc has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with the Tanzanian police force to ensure compliance with human rights standards by encouraging and supporting the provision of training on the Voluntary Principles to officers and other relevant personnel. See:
  African Barrick Gold (Tanzania)
• Please contribute your commentary or suggestions to our online discussion forum:
  Security forces and human rights online discussion forum

2. Develop multilateral security agreements

Encourage the development of a transparent and well publicised multilateral security agreement that includes:

• The company
• Relevant public security officials
• Local communities
• Local and national government
• Local and international NGOs

These can help establish clear, broad-based and recognised ‘rules' by which security will be provided – as well as the respective responsibilities of all parties concerned. In the event of violations by public security providers, stakeholders can use the terms of such an agreement as a means of exerting appropriate pressure on public security providers.

For example, in its 2013 Sustainability Report for Azerbaijan, BP reported that meetings of its Inter-Agency Security Committee have been instrumental in exchanging information with communities affected by their operations. BP established the committee in 2006 to promote structured dialogue with communities along the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus oil and gas pipelines. It includes representatives from local police forces and government agencies, as well as security officers and trained community liaison officers from BP. As a result of the engagement, BP says the number of complaints fell, and those that were made were dealt with effectively due to the established relationships between the parties.

• Talisman Energy has helped developed multilateral security agreements (or ‘convenios') in order to establish the terms under which funds are used to purchase in-kind support for the security operations provided by the Colombian military. See:
  Talisman Energy (Colombia) - in depth
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  Security forces and human rights online discussion forum

3. Use influence to promote respect for human rights

Utilise any available leverage with public security forces to promote respect for human rights in the course of their duties. For example:

• Where a company is providing operational support to public security providers – for example through funding, accommodation, transportation, etc. – companies should make the provision of such support conditional upon respect for human rights. These stipulations should ideally be embodied in a formal contract
• Where a company has high level contacts within the host government, the importance of security providers' respect for human rights for company reputation – and for its long term commitment to investment in the country – should be impressed upon them. They should be encouraged to ensure this message is passed down to relevant security providers through official channels
• Where practical, include security and human rights provisions in all original investment agreements – including defined sanctions for relevant transgressions. This might include, for example, a general requirement to adhere to the Voluntary Principles (see above) or more specific requirements relating to the training of relevant security personnel

For example, BP includes human rights and security provisions in several of its investment agreements. These include a bilateral security protocol for its Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil project, the Shah Deniz gas project, the South Caucasus gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline – and all future assets in Azerbaijan.

In 2014, Newmont Mining's security specialists in Ghana worked with the government to develop and formulate an implementation plan for the Voluntary Principles at a public level.35 The assistance provided by Newmonts' personnel included training, communication and outreach, practical guidance on MOUs, as well as workshops and conferences about extractives and security in Ghana.

• Talisman Energy has worked with the National Hydrocarbons Agency and Colombian military to reduce its chances of potential complicity through its provision of funds to buy in-kind support for security operations. See:
  Talisman Energy (Colombia) - in depth
• Newmont Mining collaborated with the Ghana government in 2014 to integrate and implement the Voluntary Principles in policy and practice, See:
• Newmont Mining (Ghana)
• Freeport-McMoran signed an MOU in 2013 with the Provincial Commander of the National Police responsible for security at the Grasberg Minerals District. The MOU establishes human rights guidelines for security operations. See:
• Freeport-McMoran (Papua)
• BP has used a bilateral security protocol to introduce a range of human rights measures into the legal framework governing its oil and gas assets in Azerbaijan, and gained government agreement for the extension of the Voluntary Principles to cover all of its future operations in the country. See:
  BP (Azerbaijan)
• In 2011 and 2012 Rio Tinto's Global Security team visit its operations in Madagascar (one of a number of sites deemed to be of a ‘high risk' nature) to strengthen on-the-ground application of the Voluntary Principles – including through training and a Memorandum of Understanding with the government. See:
  Rio Tinto (Madagascar)
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  Security forces and human rights online discussion forum

4. Consider use of private armed security providers

Where due diligence has shown that the public security force options cannot be relied on to protect human rights, propose the use of well trained and responsible private armed security providers. Ensure that the company's contracts with any such private security providers include relevant conditions relating to:

• Respect for local law
• Adherence to the company's security and human rights policy
• Implementation of an appropriate level of human rights training
• Adherence to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
• Adherence to relevant international law enforcement principles36
• Exclusion of personnel with any credible allegations of human rights abuses against them

Efforts should also be made to provide a degree of comfort to local public security officials by giving them an (appropriate) degree of operational influence over the use of private security providers (e.g. rules of engagement, deployment, etc.). Companies should only select private armed security providers with a record of professional conduct, and which are members of industry associations with relevant policies and codes of conduct to encourage good practice.

In recent years, a number of international standards governing the behaviour of private security agencies have emerged. These include the following:

• The Montreux Document: This outlines pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to the operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict.37 It is an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law whenever private military and security companies are present in armed conflicts
• The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC): This is a multi-stakeholder initiative setting out private security industry principles and standards, based on international human rights and humanitarian law.38 The 2010 Code built on work done to produce the Montreux Document. It aims to improve the accountability of the industry by establishing specific principles for the conduct of personnel and regarding management and governance
• ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012 Management System for Quality of Private Security Operations: This is an American National Standard, designated by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).39 PSC.1-2012 is the core standard – out of four in total - which addresses business and risk management for private security service providers operating in regions of high risk. The standard establishes a mechanism for providers to demonstrate commitment, conformance and accountability to the principles in the ICoC and the Montreux Document.
• ISO 18788: Management System Private Security Operations: On 18 September 2015, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), published its new standard, which is based on the documents set out above. ISO 18788 "specifies requirements and provides guidance for organizations conducting or contracting security operations. It provides a business and risk management framework for the effective conduct of security operations."40 ISO 18788 relies upon a Plan-Do-Check-Act approach, to demonstrate risk management capacity, assessment and management of community impacts, and accountability to the law and respect for human rights.

• The Charter and Principles of the British Association of Private Security Companies provide common human rights standards for armed private security providers – including refusal of "contracts for the provision of security services where this will conflict with relevant human rights law". See:
  British Association of Private Security Companies (Global) - in depth
• ExxonMobil has incorporated contractual requirements on human rights training (including on their Principles on Security and Human Rights, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and UN Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials) into more than 50 percent of its private security contracts. See:
  ExxonMobil (Global)
• Freeport-McMoRan reports that in 2014 it contributed its expertise by serving as a member of the United States' Technical Advisory Group for the development of ISO 18788: Management System Private Security Operations. See:
• Freeport-McMoRan (Global)
• Diamond mining and processing group De Beers has laid down a number of principles in its Security Forces and Human Rights Policy. This sets out a number of clear requirements for private security staff hired by the company that aim to protect human rights – and is supported by auditing, consulting and reporting programmes. See:
  De Beers (Global)
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  Security forces and human rights online discussion forum

5. Support human rights training

Provide/fund human rights training to relevant public security personnel to ensure a common understanding of:

• The human rights standards that are required of them
• The legal consequences of infringements for both the company and public security providers
• Common scenarios in which violations might take place
• The procedures that they should follow in order to avoid such violations

Training should be carried out in cooperation with security force commanders and other relevant public officials.

For example, in 2008 BP supported progressive human rights training for public security forces (as well as its own guards) at its Tangguh LNG project in West Papua, Indonesia. The initiative was conducted through an external consultancy and two senior Indonesian police instructors. Training was also provided for members from two regional police units in Bintuni and Fak-Fak, as well as members of the national police's mobile brigade.

In addition, Freeport-McMoRan provides security training to government security officials where feasible. Its PT Freeport Indonesia operation has developed a range of training materials including videos for security personnel for use in DR Congo, Chile and Peru.

• In 2008, Anglo Platinum financially supported the development of a human rights and policing training module as a core part of the South African Police Service's training curriculum. All Anglo Platinum security personnel also undertook courses in security and human rights. See:
  Anglo American (South Africa)
• In 2014, Newmont Mining highlighted the importance of training public and private security providers on the Voluntary Principles at its sites in Peru, Indonesia, Ghana and Suriname. See:
• Newmont Mining (Global)
• In 2008, BHP Billiton undertook human rights training at 35 of its sites (mainly in South Africa, Australia and South America) involving more than 11,000 employees and 14,000 contractors, whilst its operated security personnel undertook human rights training at 24 out of 29 sites. See:
  BHP Billiton (Global)
• Freeport McMoran developed and applied a new risk assessment for sites to conduct specific human rights and security risk assessments to ensure alignment with the Voluntary Principles. These assessments were implemented in DR Congo and Indonesia in 2014. See:
  Freeport-McMoran (Indonesia and DR Congo)
• In 2011, Eni carried out an extensive training exercise on the application of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights at its Bhit field in Pakistan – and gained valuable insight from participants on the value of the sensitive treatment of community members and the need to coordinate security activities with sustainability actions. See:
  Eni (Pakistan)
• In 2011 and 2012 Rio Tinto's Global Security team visit its operations in Madagascar (one of a number of sites deemed to be of a ‘high risk' nature) to strengthen on-the-ground application of the Voluntary Principles – including through training and a Memorandum of Understanding with the government. See:
  Rio Tinto (Madagascar)
• African Barrick Gold plc has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with the Tanzanian police force in 2015 to ensure compliance with human rights standards by encouraging and supporting the provision of training on the Voluntary Principles to officers and other relevant personnel. See:
  African Barrick Gold (Tanzania)
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6. Establish grievance mechanisms

Establish and publicise an independent, rights-compatible grievance mechanism to allow employees and local communities and stakeholders to lodge complaints (whether anonymous or not) regarding security practices or the behaviour of public security providers. This will:

• Allow monitoring of the human rights risks that its public security providers are posing to the company
• Allow the company to act as a ‘champion' for those whose rights have been infringed – particularly where existing legal mechanisms are unlikely to provide investigation or redress. Appropriate care should be taken regarding anonymity where complainants are at potential risk
• Provide credible evidence of ‘non-performance' by public security providers, where the company has made them subject to relevant human rights requirements (see above)

For example, Anglo American's Speak-Up program channels complaints to an external service provider that then forwards these in anonymous form to a response team within the company.41

• In 2014, Rio Tinto reported that its whistleblowing service Speak-OUT is now accessible to all employees, suppliers and contractors within to make a complaint regarding human rights violations. 5, Newmont Mining conducts quarterly internal reporting and measurement of company response and resolution of complaints and grievances. See:
• Newmont Mining (Global)Rio Tinto (Global)
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7. Promote community liaison committees

Encourage the formation of a community liaison committee with the following composition:

• The company
• Relevant public security officials
• Local communities
• Local and international NGOs
• Local and national government officials

This will provide a forum by which communities can voice recommendations, concerns and grievances in an informal and constructive way. Inaugurating this channel of communication can help ensure security arrangements remain responsive to community needs and reduce the chances of friction and conflict that may ultimately give rise to human rights violations. It can also keep the company informed of the human rights performance of relevant public security forces, allowing it to take early action with respect to potential challenges before they occur.

For example, Freeport-McMoRan has a Human Rights Policy that requires each operating site to establish its own Human Rights Compliance Officer. They serve as liaison points for site-based departments, including security, human resources and community affairs – as well as public security officials. The goal of this role is to ensure that reported human rights violations are documented, investigated and resolved in a timely fashion.

Kinross Gold reports that in 2014 alone, it engaged approximately 90,500 stakeholders – including community members, government representatives and non-profit organisations in order to promote strong communication with affected communities and other local stakeholders.42 Kinross establishes transparent relations with local stakeholders by holding regular meetings with officials and neighbours; giving presentations to communities, businesses, governments and schools; opening mines for public tours; participating in local cultural and sports events; and being open to daily, informal and impromptu conversations. The company reports that it has never experienced a major event or permitting delay caused by stakeholder concerns despite operating in high risk locations in West Africa and Latin America.

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Public security provision

Public security providers can broadly be broken down into the following types:

• International armed forces (e.g. UN, EU, African Union forces, etc.)
• National armed forces (e.g. army units, etc.)
• National security services (e.g. internal intelligence agencies, etc.)
• National and local paramilitary forces (e.g. gendarmeries, etc.)
• National and local police forces (federal and local police, etc.)
• Local, citizen-based security groups (e.g. town guards, militias, self-defence groups, etc.)

Public security forces should provide effective protection to the civilian population against human rights violations, while acting within the law and under the control of civil authority. Governments have the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights, which includes ensuring that its security forces do not themselves commit human rights violations.

However, governments do not always fulfil this responsibility. In many cases public security forces are the worst perpetrators of human rights abuses. According to the Maplecroft's Security Forces and Human Rights Index 2015, the 10 highest risk countries (all of which are considered to present an ‘Extreme Risk') are:

Figure 1: 10 highest risk countries for security forces and human rights43

1. Eritrea	6. Egypt
2. Iran	7. Sudan
3. North Korea	8. Afghanistan
4. Syria	9. Iraq
5. Central African Republic	10. Cambodia

Business and security

Companies operating in emerging economies are often faced with significant security challenges. Such challenges regularly arise in countries where the security forces, paramilitaries, and private security companies have a history of committing human rights violations. This may be as a result of current or previous armed conflict, because the security forces are corrupt and ill-disciplined, or there are significant governance gaps.

Ironically, the attributes of operating environments that make the need for enlisting security personnel most compelling (e.g. political instability, conflict and insurgency, weak civilian control, public repression, etc.), also make it unlikely that security forces will act in a legitimate, controlled and responsible way.

This is reflected in the fact that five out of the 10 countries that represent the highest risk to human security are the same countries that represent the highest risks with respect to security forces and human rights. According to the Maplecroft's Human Security Risk Index 2015, the 10 highest risk countries (all of which are considered to present an ‘Extreme Risk') are:

Figure 3: 10 highest risk countries for human security

1. Syria	6. Afghanistan
2. Iraq	7. Pakistan
3. DR Congo	8. Nigeria
4. Sudan	9. Yemen
5. Central African Republic	10. South Sudan

Post-conflict countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and others are also likely to pose particular challenges in this respect. Whilst they are not ranked as ‘Extreme Risk', public security personnel in these countries have often been conditioned by years of violence, have ready access to firearms and have developed a culture in which the use of excessive violence is relatively normal.

Human rights impact

Human rights that are typically subject to violations by repressive and/or ill-disciplined public security forces include:

• Right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (ICCPR, Article 9): Whilst many public security forces are likely to have legitimate powers of arrest, in the case of poorly regulated and judicially unaccountable paramilitary and military forces, there is a danger that illegitimate arrest and detention will take place with impunity.
• Right to life (ICCPR, Article 6): The use of armed guards present particular risks in terms of the legitimate (i.e. in lawful self-defence), illegitimate (e.g. use of excessive force) and accidental (e.g. negligent discharge) killing of local people and/or employees.
• Right not to be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment (ICCPR, Article 7): Where companies are relying on security forces with very poor human rights records, they run a serious risk that they may be complicit in acts of inhuman treatment or torture – whether by public security units or individual public security personnel. This is particularly the case where such forces form the only real authority in an area and are not subject to close oversight.
• Right of detained persons to humane treatment (ICCPR, Article 10): Public security forces are likely to need to detain individuals in the course of their duties. Even if such detention is legitimate in the circumstances, the detainee's rights are likely to be violated if they are held in inadequate or inhumane conditions – for example without food or water, in extreme heat or cold, etc.
• Right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour (including sexual and economic exploitation and trafficking) (ICCPR, Article 8): In extreme cases, public security forces may forcibly enlist local people, either for their own purposes (for example the provision of food, domestic services or sex) or for purposes that indirectly benefit a company (for example land clearance and other forms of unskilled labour). Security forces may also be posted to ensure that a company's employees are unable to leave the factory, creating a situation of forced labour.
• Right to freedom of movement (ICCPR, Article 12): In some cases, security forces may infringe people's right to free movement. For example, illegitimately obstructing access roads using checkpoints and road-blocks, thereby making land inaccessible to the local population, could constitute an infringement of this right.

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